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Abstract
Financial records, medical records, corporate personnel files, police
records, and many other types of data are kept: on most Americans and are
stored in computerized systems. The potential of misuse of the information
stored on these systems has caused concern in the minds of some. Unfortu-
nately, the abuse of t:his information already occurs in very real and far-
reaching ways. Improper employment pract:ices. dissemination of personal
information, and even surveillance of private citizens through the abuse
of these systems have become all-tao-common event:s in America today.
This paper studies bot:h the pot:ential for information abuse and cases
where abuses of this sort already occur. Possible solut:ions to this prob-
lem, as suggested by various aut:horities, are also surveyed. The primary
purpose of this report is to create a greater awareness of the current: lack
of personal information privacy.
This paper was derived from a class project for CS 590s, taught by
Professor Eugene Spafford at Purdue Universit:y in the Spring of 1990.
Introduction
Financial records, medical records, corporate personnel files, police
records, and many other types of data are kept on most Americans and are
stored in computerized systems. The potential of misuse of the information
stored on thes.e systems has caused concern in the minds of some. Unfortu-
nately, the abuse of tllis information already occurs in very real and
far-reaching ways. Improper employment practices, dissemination of personal
information, and even surveillance of private citizens through the abuse
of these systems have become all-too-common event.s in America today.
There is a need for great.er awareness of t.his problem and of how the
government allows (and in some cases encourages) abuses of personal infor-
mation to occur. Once one understands the problem, then one can attempt
to find a solution, if indeed a solution exists.
Financial Privacy
A man and his wife l-lent to an unfamiliar auto dealership to shop for
a car. A salesman talked with them for 10 minutes and then went into his
office for a brief period of time. Jolhen he returned, he offered to sell
the car to the man with no further questions.
When the man asked how the salesman could trust a purchaser with a
new car simply on his signature, the salesman escorted the man to his
office. There he typed the man's name into a computer terminal on his
( 2)
desk, and instant.ly the customer's full credit, financial, and earnings
hist.ory appeared on the screen [Linowes, p. 126:1.
Stories like this are not uncommon. In fact, many companies use such
systems, provided by consumer reporting bureaus, to learn of a customer's
complete financial history. Many would find this relative ease shocking
(as did the customer in this story), but it is fairly common today.
Such reporting agencies have existed for many years, but it is only
through the advent of the computer that they can produce results so
quickly. "The five largest credit reporting companies in the United States
maintain in their computers more than 150 million individual credit
records." This information includes "full name, Social Security number,
address, telephone number, name of spouse, place of work, salary, other
sources of income, names of credit grantors, complete payment history,
arrest and conviction records, bankruptcies, tax liens, and lawsuits"
[Burnham, p. 42]. Anyone who uses a credit reporting agency can gain
access to some or all of this information on anyone whose records are
filed with this company. Since so many people have such access, it would
not be difficult for an individual to ask a friend or co-worker to ask
the credit reporting company for any desired information. In this way,
any fact in the above list that is known about another person can be found
out with little fear of detection or punishment.
This kind of information is not always correct, though, which is not
surprising considering the number of people documented by these services.
Consider the case of Lucky Kellener of Los Angeles. In 1978 he paid his
brother's rent. \~hen his brother was evicted several months later,
Kellener's name was (inadvertently) included in the court papers. U. D.
(3)
Registry, a credit reporting agency, entered this incorrect listing in its
records on Kellener, identifying him as an "undesirable tenant." Three
years lat.er, when trying to find a larger apartment, Kellener was coldly
refused by three apartment houses before he learned of his "blacklisting"
[Burnham, pp. 34-35].
In another Los Angeles case involving U. D. Registry, Barbara Ward
was also unable to rent an apartment. Hhen she found that her first
apartment was infested with cockroaches and run by a landlord who refused
to exterminate them, she tried to move. For revenge the landlord attempted
to have her evicted. The landlord did not appear at the hearing, so the
judge ordered the case off the calendar. However, because she once had
received an eviction notice, she was unable to find another apartment
several years later [Burnham, p. 35].
One of the largest credit record bureaus is TRW. It currently sells
35 million credit reports a year to 24,000 subscribers nationwide.
Approximately 90 million customers have records stored in TRW's gi~antic
computer system (the largest single conunercial concentration of computers
in the \-Iorld). Needless to say, a company of this size could not function
efficiently if it bothered to double-check all of its information. As a
result, about 350,000 individual SUbjects register formal complaints with
TRW's consumer relations department about the inaccuracy of their reports
[Burnham, pp. 44-45:1. Considering the desire of most people to avoid
unnecessary paperwork, one must wonder how often inconsistencies in records
are not reported (not to mention how often errors in records are not even
detected).
Several states have created laws to protect consumers from privacy
(4)
violations of their financial records. Forty-five states have "statutory
recognition of financial privacy," and nine have "legislation regulating
the disclosure of an individual's financial records." California has
legislation requiring that a bank customer be given a IO-day notice
before a state investigator can obtain records of the cust.omer's finan-
cial transactions at that bank. Alabama statutes require that financial
records be surrendered at the request of a government agency or under
court order. Alabama law does note that these records should only be
disclosed upon legal process. Other similar statutes exist, but most
(like these) only protect the customer from disclosure of his bank trans-
actions [Linowes, pp. 111-112]. Other financial records do not. have such
prot.ect.ions. In fact, even the statut.es prot.ect.ing bank records may not.
be adequate. In Unit.ed St.at.es v. Miller (1976), t.he Supreme Court. ruled
that a cust.omer's records are not owned by him but. rat.her by t.he bank
(Miller's bank records had been subpoenaed without. his knowledge)
[Burnham, p. 168:1.
Most people believe that such records, particularly bank records,
cannot be disclosed to anyone without their express permission. Even
those who are aware of disclosures seldom realize how many people have
access to their records and how quickly these records can be obt.ained wit.h
current comput.er net.working technology. Perhaps there will not. be wide-
spread complaint. about t.hese pract.ices until many people have been approached
by ot.hers with informat.ion about t.hemselves t.hat t.hey believed was privat.e.
Privacy of Medical Records
"A middle-aged woman, hospitalized for a t.umor, learned that. it was
'I'm so sorry to hear you have cancer,' the
(5 )
malignant and began receiving chemotherapy treatment.s. Returning to work
a few weeks later, she was edgy, anxious, and extremely sensitive regarding
her condition. She did not Hant others to know about her illness fearing
they would treat her as an object of pity. Yet on her very first day back
at work following her confinement she was stopped on the way to her desk
by a sympathetic co-worker.
other employee remarked.
"The patient's medical record was on file in the personnel office
because the employer administered a group healt.h policy. Easily accessible,
the entire staff learned of her condition" [Linowes, p. 120].
Cases like this are not rare. Medical information is often used in
employment-related decisions. The idea that a person's medical records
are private dates back many centuries. It is surprising that such an
ancien't notion could be so easily and inobtrusively cast aside for the
sake of "effective decision making." Instances where employee medical
records are known by co-workers are most common in companies that have
group medical benefits.
These information releases are justified by insurers because "we are
obligated to tell the employer because he pays the premiums." However,
since the insurance is for a group medical plan, the premiums are paid by
the workers, and the employer is only a middleman in the payment transaction.
Thus there is no reason for an employer to see data on specific employees.
Another consideration is that, in cases where psychiatric care is admini-
stered, patients may avoid further treatment because of fear that their
problems will be revealed in detail to co-workers (a common occurrence)
[Linowes, p. 120:1.
(6 )
The most unfortunate aspect of improper medical information releases
is that they could be easily avoided at no harm to the company. By
bypassing a company's personnel office and sending claims directly to the
carrier's office (t"here those who see the information are not co-workers
of the patient and are instructed not to reveal medical information), only
those who pay for the claims need know of their purpose [LinOl.;es. p. 122].
The view held by many employers that every aspect of an employee's
life should be examined "t-l'hen making hiring and career decisions about that
employee encourages these kinds of privacy violations. If an employer
wants to know why an employee tV'ent to see a psychiatrist, ."hy doesn't he
just ask him? If the employee refuses to answer, and there has been no
negative change in his lwrk performance, ~hy question it? Nany proponents
of these measures consider their intrusion to be valid because they "head
off future problems." In fact, they may cause more harm to their company
than they prevent because of the loss of employer/employee trust. The
desire of some employees to avoid necessary medical treatment in order to
maintain their personal privacy can become a major problem.
Corporations and Employee Privacy
John, a 20-year employee and executive vice-president of a company,
was first in line to replace the soon-retiring president. To his (and
others') surprise, the second vice-president .~as chosen, despite his
inferiority to John in experience and credentials. After attempts to
learn the explanation of this decision failed, he hired a lawyer who
subpoenaed the files of the selection committee. In those files was a
copy of John's medical records. In a noted section, his personal doctor
(7)
lYrote that the "patient seems to have trouble managing his finances."
This was written at a time when John was having persistent headaches, and
his doctor was examining the possibility of stress as a cause. I~hen the
selection committee read this remark, they concluded that if John was
incapable of handling his own finances, he could not be trusted with the
company's.
John was unable to get the president.'s job, but he was able to explain
this remark to otllers in the future [Linowes, p. 27]. He had assumed that.
his records were privat.e, and even then did not know their contents. This
is one of many examples l~ilere seemingly the only person who does not
possess a piece of information is the person who the information is about.
In Chicago, one woman I-Ias repeatedly refused government employment
because of a note in her grammar school records. "Her third grade teacher
carelessly wrote on a report that the woman's mother was crazy" [Linowes.
p. 23]. This is a slightly different kind of computer record abuse. In
this case, the potential employer put too much emphasis on third-hand.
questionably reliable information that was not directly related to the
employee. Perhaps this is similar to cases of people believing in their
computers too much. The idea that "if the computer said it. then it must
be right" is hardly new, but as computers are used to manage greater
amounts of personal data, this blind faith in their "omniscience" becomes
a much greater threat to personal privacy.
In the early 1970's, Richard Schwartz and Jerome Skolnick. both
sociologists, performed a study on the effects of such information on
hiring practices. They showed employment files on 100 men being consi-
dered for a menial job to a group of employers. Each of these hundred
(8)
men belonged to one of four groups. In one group, the men had no criminal
records. A "second group had each been arrested for assault and acquitted
of the charge with a letter from the judge explaining the presumption of
innocence. II The third group "had been arrested for assault and acquitted,
but there was no lett.er from the judge. The fourth group had been convic-
ted."
Hhen "asked whether they would be willing to offer the individuals
in each group a job," "36 percent said they would hire the men with no
record, 24 percent said they would hire the men who had been acquitted
and had a letter from the judge, 12 percent said they lwuld hire the men
who had been acquitted but had no lett.er, and four percent said they would
hire the men who had been convict:ed" [Burnham, pp. 79-80].
Nany similar st:udies demonstrate the same principle: the appearance
of criminality in any form, even without a conviction, is appropriate
reason for refusing employment:. Apparently the American legal not:ion
t:hat a person is innocent until proven guilty is not held in high regard
by many employers.
Anot:her st:udy conducted at: t:he Universit:y of Illinois examined many
facets of personal information and its use by corporations. One hundred
twent:y-six Fortune 500 companies took part in the st:udy. Responses of
not:e include the following: 38 percent "do not have a policy concerning
which records are routinely disclosed to inquiries from goverrunent agen-
ciesj" 80 percent "disclose personal information to credit grantors;" 43
percent "inform personnel of the types of records maintained;" 41 percent
inform on how records are used; 42 percent consider it "necessary to
collect information without informing the individual" [Linowes, pp. 40-41].
( 9)
Although such policies are not always adhered to, they can be an
effective means of curbing privacy violations in the i~orkplace. Ford
Motor Company I 5 "Fair Information Practice Principles" [LinOl~e5J p. 31]
is an excellent example of what a corporate privacy st.andard should be
like. (This standard is too long to be reprinted here, but interested
readers are encouraged to use the Ford example as a model of what can
be done.)
Privacy and Law Enforcement
Nichael Ducross was stopped by police on 2lj March 1980 for making an
illegal left-hand turn near his home in Huntington Beach, California.
The officer ran a check on Ducross using the FBI's National Crime Infor-
mation Center, a computer-operated crime data system in Washington, D.. C:
The computer responded that Ducross was wanted for being A~WL from the
Marine Corps since Christmas Eve of 1969. Ducross was taken to the brig
at Camp Pendleton. He was held for five months before the Marine Corps
dropped the charges. Ducross had never been AHOL. He left the Marines
"under a special discharge program available to foreign citizens and
Native Americans" (Ducross is a Canadian-born Indian) [Burnham, pp. 33-34].
Law enforcement examples of the effects of erroneous data are the
most commonly used when discussing privacy issues. Most people are
familiar with tales of mistaken identity, but cases like this one, where
the information stored on a person is simply incorrect, are becoming more
and more common. At the heart of virtually all of these stories is either
the FBI itself, or the crime data systems the FBI operates. Not only is
the FBI a CUlprit in many cases of "data botching," but their use of the
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databases of other government agencies, each with many faults as well.
multiplies the problem.
Coupled with this are the FBI's persistent efforts to create a
national network of crime information, so that it would not have to go
through other agencies to gain access to personal data. There is some
indication that such a system could be constructed in the all-too-near
future. Attorney General Edward Levi and Attorney General Griffin Bell
found three major concerns that prompted them to stop the construction of
this system. First, 1-1'110 should control the network? Second, will the
variation in state lat-ls and local policies and the often inaccurate nature
of the records reduce a person's chances for a fair trial? And third,
"could such a system be used to keep track of American citizens who are not
criminals?" [Burnham, pp. 6ll-6ll]
Others have suggested that the data system would not even by very
effective in fighting crime. As explained by the supervisor of a burglary
section in a large California city, "The idea that a national rap sheet
system would make an important contribution to our work here is just a
bunch of baloney. Our problem is not to find out who the guy is. Our
biggest problem is once we catch him coming out of a house Idth the goods,
how do we keep him in jail and how do we make sure he stays in jail. If
anything, we have over-information-oriented and over-computerized this
department, The patrol officer learns to use the vast array of informa-
tion resources at his command, which means you learn to sit in a car and
punch in the numbers of people's license plates and the numbers of people'S
driver I s licenses, l-[hat this does is inhibit the development of tradi-
tional police skills, of interviewing, interrogating, and investigating.
(11)
He need people to get out of their offices and get out of their cars and
talk to people. Most of our leads come from citizens reporting a crime or
having heard about a crime. Hithout these resources, which have nothing
to do l.;ith computers and criminal histories, we would be dead" [Burnham,
p. 72].
"Based on detailed interviews with criminal justice decision makers
at local and state levels, a national [computerized criminal history]
system as currently conceived would bring about little or no measurable
change in the decision-making process of police, prosecutors, criminal
court magistrates, and probation/parole personnel. The promised public
benefit of a national criminal history system appears to be nonexistent.
On the other hand, a national [coriJ.pute::i:ized-::criminal.~history]system would
have a great impact on organizational decision making in the public and
private employment areas. There is considerable evidence that employers
Idll take very seriously the fact that an employee has a criminal history
record" [Laudon, p. 325].
"Contrary to popular belief and what the police sometimes contend,
research indicates that very few arrests are the result of any kind of
investigation at all" [Burnham, p. 70]. Some also suggest that the only
changes in the abuse of personal privacy since the pre-computer days are
that searches can be done more quickly and that people are more aware of
what the government can find out about them and how the government does
it.
What defense does the citizen have against inaccurate information in
police records becoming public and damaging his reputation? Unfortunately,
it does not appear that he has much of any. For example, there is the
(12)
Supreme Court case of Paul v. Davis.
EdHard Charles Davis III was arrested for shoplifting on 14 June 1971
and pled not guilty. Seven mont.hs later, he found that the police had
given a five-page flyer to liOO local merchants naming Davis and others as
"known shoplifters." The case against Davis was dismissed shortly after
this list I"as distributed.
"Davis sued the police in federal court for violating his right to
due process by pUblicly branding him a criminal without a trial." The
Supreme Court determined that "every defamation by a public official" of a
private cit.izen is not a "depravation of liberty" in regard to due process
[Burnham, p. 171].
This case sets the precedent that, essentially. law enforcement
officials, even at the local level, do not need proof of a crime to attach
a warning label of "potential criminal" to a person's record. The impli-
cations of this are staggering. Potentially, such a precedent could be
used to allow abuses ranging from local embarrassment of a personal enemy
to nationwide persecution of a particular group of people within society.
Such actions would certainly not be new, as will be discussed later.
However, one would have thought that a nation built on the principle of
personal liberty would advance in the protection of its individuals from
a potential police state rather than encourage such a state to develop.
Government and Personal Privacy
Irwin Blye, the head of a New York City investigative firm, was given
the challenge of learning all he could about an individual without ever
even speaking to him. For his usual fee, Blye produced a standard five-
(13)
page (single-spaced) report on the man (a New Jersey newspaperman) and his
background, including his father's income before his retirement. All of
this information was found legally, although not: all of it was correct.
Blye also has called banks and by "sounding knowledgeable" was able
to discover a customer's complete bank record. This. too, is perfectly
legal [Linowes. p. 159].
lilly can an ordinary citizen gain access to so much information about
others? This question is often asked in cases such as this. Unfortunat.ely,
most people overlook a greater question. If a private citizen can legally
learn a person's address, occupation, and financial information, Hilat does
the government know about this person?
Anyone who does not believe that the government can easily track them
down is either uninformed or naively patriotic. The IRS has a program
that tracks down parents who do not pay their court-ordered child support
using various federal data systems. "For 1981 returns filed in 1982, the
IRS used its computers to prevent the distribution of $168 million in
refunds scheduled to go to 275,479 delinquent parents" [Burnham, p. 32].
The program, which began in California, works by giving refunds due to
delinquent parents to their children instead.
The Federal Child Support Enforcement Office works along a similar
line. According t.o Louis Hays, the direct.or of the Office, in about one
year "t.he states asked us for address information on 200,000 individuals.
We put those names on magnetic tapes and periodically submitted them to the
Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Administration, the Defense
Department, the Veterans Administration, and the National Personnel
Record Center." The Office then sends the information back to the states.
( 14)
Hays also has said that it is easy to find the delinquent parents.
Getting them to pay is the difficult. part of the process [Burnham, p. 31].
The government has many other beneficial programs that use the power
of computers to save money and increase effectiveness. "Computer matching
covers many processes used to detect payment errors, increase debt collec-
tion. and identify abusive grant. or procurement practices. The Department
of Education, for instance, uses computer matches to identify federal work-
ers who default on student loans. The National Science Foundation screens
research fund applicants agains't its employee and consultant lists to pre-
vent: any conflict of interest in grant awards" [Kusserow, p. 542].
"The federal Department of Health and Human Services uses matches to
unearth doctors who are dOUble-billing Medicare and Medicaid for the same
service. Over 230 problem health providers were removed from participa-
tion in the Medicare program in [1984]--a 253 percent increase over the
previous year. [TIley-] have'_also~matched the' Social, Security benefit
rolls against Medicare's record of deceased patients and discovered
thousands of cases of administrative error and fraud. This project alone
resulted in savings of over $25 million" [Kusserow, p. 542:1. "Computer
matching and other innovative techniques helped [the federal Department
of Health and Human Services] identify $1.4 billion in savings--about a
300 percent increase over the previous year" [Kusserow, p. 542].
Indeed, computer systems do serve many good purposes. In just the
case of computer matching, these systems can be used for: "assuring that
ineligible applicants are not given costly program benefits; reducing or
terminating benefits for recipients who are being paid erroneously;
detecting fraudulent claims and deterring others from defrauding the pro-
(15)
gram; collec~ing overpayments or defaulted loans more effectively; moni-
toring grant and contract award processes; improving program policy, pro-
cedures, and controls" [Kusserow, p. 543].
Louis Hays, like most government officials, does not believe that
t:hese systems could be used for mass traCking of people or civil rights
abuses by the government. Unfortunately, such violations of proper in-
formation use have already occurred several times in U. S. history.
In 1942 J I.;hen the internment. of Japanese Americans began, the govern-
ment asked the Census Bureau to provide information on the names and
addresses of all Japanese Americans living on the West Coast. Most Ameri-
cans are led to believe that such information is confiden'tial. In fact,
the Bureau's own legal charter sta'tes tilat "in no case shall information
furnished under the authority of this ac't be used to the detriment of the
person or persons to whom such information relates." Indeed, the Census
Bureau has since denied that it has ever given out specific names and
addresses. For the most part, this has been true, although during World
I~ar I they did help the government track down draft dodgers with such data.
In the case of the Japanese Americans, however, the Census Bureau only
provided aggregate information (except in one instance, when under press-
ure from the military the Bureau did give out specific names and addresses).
At that time, Bureau officials would "layout on a table various city
blocks where Japanese lived and then would tell ... how many were living
in each block" [Burnham, pp. 23-24]. The rest was up to the military, and
history shows how effective they were at their work.
Under President Johnson, army intelligence agents "monitored the
membership and policies- of peacefUl o~ga.nizat.ililIls:'Who:.we'X"e··_concerned;wJ.th
(16)
the war in Southeast Asia, t.he draft, racial and labor problems, and
community lo1elfare" [Burnham, p. 36]. "Christopher H. Pyle, a former Army
intelligence officer has revealed: 'The Army maintains files on the mem-
bership, ideology, program, and practices of virtually every activist
political group in t.he country. These include not only such violence-
prone organizations as the Minutemen and the Revolutionary Action Nove-
ment (RAM). but such non-violent groups as the Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference, Clergy and Laymen United Against the War in Vietnam, the
American Civil Liberties Union. Homen Strike for Peace, and the National
Association for t:he Advancement of Colored People'" [Miller, p. 40].
"Out of this surveillance, the army created blacklists of organizations
and personalities t..hich ."ere circulated to many federal, state, and local
agencies that. {..ere asked to supplement. t.he data provided. Not. only des-
criptions of the contents of speeches and political conunents were inclu-
ded, but. irrelevant entries about personal finanaces, such as the fact.
that a militant leader's credit card l ..as withdrawn. In some cases, a
psychiatric analysis taked from the army or other medical records was
included" [Burnham, p. 36].
Our future may be seen in the actions other nat.ions have already
taken to abuse information systems for purposes of "improving their
country." In 1982, a Norwegian research project studied "police files,
school records. and health data to identify small children with potential
psychological problems that might lead to later ant.isocial activities"
[Gray, p. 251].
In the time it takes to get a cup of coffee. t.he government can learn
a wealth of information about many members of our society. Most people
(17)
realize that they are on file Hith agencies such as the Social Security
Administration, but the existence of many other goverrunent records on
them is not. as well knOlm. "For example: if you are an executive in a
company that has military contracts, you are probably on file with the
Defense Intelligence Agency; if your child ever applied for a student
loan, you are probably on file with the Department of Education; if you
'fere involved in a banking transaction exceeding $10,000. the Treasury
Department has you on file; if you are a corporate officer, the Securities
and Exchange Commission has a business profile on YOll; if a teenager in
your family ever faced a drug or similar charge, the details are probably
on file !-lith the Justice Department; if you made a political contribution
of $100 or more, a record on you is kept with the Clerk of Congress or
Federal Election Commission" [Linowes, p. 82].
The fact that the goverrunent has all of this information and uses it
is more disturbing l-lhen one remembers the inaccuracy of their data. One
study of the National Crime Information Network Computerized Criminal
History system found that 5li.l percen.t of the records had some "significant
quality problem." FBI Ident records had quality problems in an almost
unbelievable 7li.l percent of all records [Gray, p. 2li9]. Couple this with
the fact that 95 percent of all working Americans work for corporations,
66 percent have life insurance, and 90 percent are covered by health
plans [Burnham, p. 49], the wealth of informat.ion on the life and live-
lihood of most Americans is astounding. Even more worrisome is the fact
that most maintainers of these systems are more than happy to comply with
requests for information made by goverrunent agencies, particularly the FBI.
A new term was even coined to describe this kind of surveillance:
(iB)
dataveillance. It is described as "the systematic use of personal data
systems in the inves'tigation or monitoring of the actions or communications
of one or more persons" [Clarke, p. 499:1. It should be clear that data-
veillance and other forms of privacy violations will eventually begin to
affect the way society operates Cif it has not already). In his paper
on dataveillance, Roger Clarke suggests several possible effects of these
policies and procedures that are well Horth examining. In his list of
threats to society he offers: establishment of a "prevailing climate of
suspicion;" development of "adversarial relationships;" shifting 'the "focus
of lal.. enforcement" to "easily detectable and provable offenses" (which
arguably is already happening)j "inequitable application of the law;
decreased respect for the law; reduction in the meaningfulness of indi-
vidual actions; reduction in self-reliance and self-determination; stult-
ification of originality; increased tendency to opt out of the official
level of society; weakening of society'S moral fiber and cohesion; desta-
bilization of the strategic balance of power;" and "repressive potential
for a totalitarian government:" [Clarke, p. 505]. If these potential
effects seem extreme and unlikely. perhaps our understanding of the extent
of current dataveillance is insufficient. As David Burnham writes, "Does
not surveillance. even the innocent sort, gradually poison the soul of a
nation? Does not surveillance limit personal options for many individual
citizens? Does not surveillance increase the pm-lers of those who are in a
position to enjoy the fruits of this activity?" [Burnham, p. li7]
Hhat about the Privacy Act of 1971i? Does it offer any real protection
from dataveillance? Not necessarily. Although it attempts to "define
individual rights in relation to stored data." it is generally not enforced
(19)
[Gray, p. 2lJ4]. "The political milieu which favored passage of the Privacy
Act of 1971J has changed and is not supportive of (these) proposals"
[Laudon, p. tlQO]. It has become a sort of privacy "jaywalking" law. It
Hill only be used either in extreme cases, or to exact revenge on someone
for harboring disrespect for authority.
The main shortcomings of the Privacy Act are well known.
"1. It fails to provide for an independent enforcement mechanism,
a Privacy Protection Commission.
2. It vests enforcement of the act i~ith individuals who may
recover actual damages by bringing civil suits if a government
agency willfully and intentionally violates the act..
3. The act provides no recourse to individuals whose records
have been abused by virtue of incompetence. error, and mistake.
4. It fails to provide concrete guidelines or general performance
criteria for the development of new systems and the enhancement
of existing systems.
5. It fails to prevent because of ambiguous language the develop-
ment of general purpose, national information systems capable of
widespread social surveillance"
[Laudon, pp. 374-375].
In the case of IRS information, the courts have ruled that "Fifth
Amendment protections do not prevent prosecution if an individual violates
IRS filing requirements" [Gray, p. 247]. Although the IRS occasionally
denies requests for information that are made by other government agencies,
in most situations it honors these requests.
Many people argue that such information only affects "1Yrongdoers"
and is needed by the goverrunent to do its job. partiCUlarly in the area·. of
law enforcement. But the potential for widespread abuse cannot be denied.
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"Effective merging of data files can tell [the government] Hith great
accuracy what people do and where (previously requiring physical sur-
veillance) and what. they think, read, and express (previously requiring
electronic surveillance)" (Laudon, p. 380].
Edgar Dunn suggests that there are several conflicts within govern-
ment that affect how information is handled with respect to personal
privacy. These conflicts include: "personal privacy versus effective
government, personal privacy versus behavioral research, personal privacy
versus law enforcement, and personal privacy versus free dissemination of
the news" [Gray, p. 246].
The Shortcomings of Privacy Legislation
The picture of privacy in our society seems to be somewhat grim. Is
there existing legislation that can be used to protect the privacy of
American citizens? Some laws do exist, but their usefulness has been
questioned by many.
"The regulatory and legal framework devised in the early 1970's to
ensure the social control of [computerized criminal history] systems and
their compliance l ..ith constitutional and statutory requirements is inade-
quate. Management responsibilities ot maintain accurate, unambiguous,
and complete information, and the ability to account for the flow of
information, cannot be enforced for a variety of financial, political, and
institutional reasons. The protection of individual rights as defined in
regulation cannot be assured given the inability of systems to control the
dissemination of criminal history records and to purge or seal these rec-
ords when required to do so by the courts" [Laudon, p. 323].
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"There are no comprehensive federal or state statutes that specifi-
cally address criminal history information or related 'hot files' such as
wanted t.:arrant systems" [Laudon, p. 146]. "Unlike systems operated by the
Int:ernal Revenue Service or the Social Security Administration, there is
no single federal jurisdictional authority to control the ebb and flow of
criminal information. Neither are there federal enforcement mechanisms
for viOlation of federal or state statutes" [Laudon, p. 146].
"Under current federal law and regulations, there are no civil or
criminal penalties for violation of [National Crime Information Center
(NGle) Computerized Criminal Hist.ory] system standards. Although agencies
failing to comply with regUlations on federal systems, or with NCIC system
standards (i.e., management-imposed standards) are SUbject to cancellation
of NCIC and Ident services. As a practical matter, however, this has
never been invoked" [Laudon, p. 315].
"Existing regulations provide only a weak basis for authorizing the
FBI to operate a national criminal history system: they fail to identify
the type and nature of criminal history system that the FBI will be per-
mitted to operate; fail to identify the specific management responsibi-
lities of the FBI vis-a-vis state contributors; fail to identify the
precise role which the states and the federal government are to play in a
cooperative venture to create a national system; fail to provide for
external audit; and provide only for a weak form of management oversight,
leaving most important matters such as auditing, data quality, file content,
and file size to FBI management and state authorities" [Laudon, p. 313].
"The existing common-law structure does nothing to give the data
SUbject a right to participate in decisions relating to personal information
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about him, a right that is essential if he is to learn lo1hether he has been
victimized by a privacy invasion" [Hiller, p. 189]. "It makes no sense to
rely on the victim's right to bring suit against those who have injured
him IJhen he is not informed of the source of his injury--or, in some cases,
he remains unaHare of the fact that he has been damaged. Even if he later
discovers that his informational profile has been disfigured, an individual
may find it impossible to sue if his grievance has become too ancient to
command the law's attention" [Hiller, p. 189].
Occasionally, though, someone actually does attempt to sue because of
damage to his reputation. In general, such suits do not succeed. The
reason for this is a matter of basic, simple law. "The Supreme Court has
never held that the integrity of a person's reputation is constitutionally
protected. Furthermore, it is sometimes stated that the best corrective
for the injuries caused by a defamation is more rather than less speech,
on the theory that the truth eventually will win out if open debate is
encouraged. This point has no validity in the privacy context, however,
because further discussion of the sensitive information will only increase
the injury to the individual's privacy" [Miller, p. 193].
Not only does the Supreme Court have this view, but "the Supreme
Court has held that falsehoods published by a government official acting
within the scope of his discretionary authority are absolutely privileged"
[Miller, p. 196]. "The notion that the courts will recognize a general
principle requiring data handlers to treat personal information as con-
fidential or will declare that file keepers owe a fiduciary duty to file
subjects seems to be wishful thinking. Nor is it realistic to think that
a pledge of confidentiality can be secured on a contractual basis" [Miller,
(23)
p. 200.1.
This is not to say that legislation could not be created to counter
privacy problems. But such legislation does not yet exist, and some are
not sure that it ever will. Public policy has failed to regulat.e these
systems for several reasons: there is a lack of basic research on the
organization and use of informationj poor system development practices
have been used in the creation of these systems; the systems are supp-
orted by legislators in order to win voters; the interest.s of bureau-
cra-cic organizat.ions in the government have prevailed; congressional
red tape has hampered efforts to enact privacy legislation [Laudon,
pp. 3lJ2-366].
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of information that warrant protection at their point of origin, rather
than continuing its current, capricious course of imposing liability only
if the material is ultimately disseminated to the pUblic at large" [Hixson,
p. 1821.
Changes in legislation are necessary to insure privacy. There is
dispute. however, on I-l'hat changes should be made. One thing that is
agreed upon is that these changes will not be simple. As Arthur Hiller has
written, "Extremely complex legislation ... is necessary if specific privacy
safeguards are to be prescribed." "To insure adequate proctection, legi-
slation ",auld have to prescribe how these techniques should be used, deal
with virtually every aspect of information integrity, and dralJ difficult
distinctions in terms of levels of information sensitivity" [Hiller, p. 224:1.
Unfortunately, it may be very difficult to motivate Congress to create
any nelJ privacy legislation. "Congressional inertia, a lack of technical
expertise on Capitol Hill, and tIle labyrinthine character of the computer-
privacy problem all combine to make it extremely unlikely that a refined
statutory scheme will emerge in the foreseeable future" [Miller, p. 224:J.
The idea of an overseeeing government agency has been proposed by
some. One early supporter of this idea IJas the late Senator Sam Ervin.
In a speech delivered in November 1969 at the Wharton School of Finance
and Commerce, Ervin stated his case.
"I see no existing agency which could assume these compli-
cated and delicate problems. Those charged IJith regulating
communications have built-in biases in their operating methods and
their approaches to these problems, partiCUlarly the preservation
of individual privacy.
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\'1hile I dislike adding to an already weighty bureaucracy,
the problem is serious enough to warrant a separat.e agency. For
t:his reason, therefore, I would support the creation of some
separate agency to deal specifically wit.h computer systems.
T believe \-le have learned enough over the past 50 years
about the design and operations and problems of regulat.ory
agencies to enable us to create one tV'hich has built-in protec-
tions to assure that it serves the interests of the individual
citizen and not solely those of the industry it is supposed to
regula tel' [Miller, p. 233:1.
As David Flaherty has t"rit.ten, "Hithout a privacy protection commis-
sion, it will be of dubious utility to continue to rely on individuals
protecting their privacy through their own initiative in the courts and on
shaping data protection legislation on a sector-by-sector basis. The pro-
cesses are simply too expensive and complicated to be accomplished l~itllOut
continuing input by the specialists working for a data protection agency.
A privacy protection commission would facilitate the design, justifica-
tion, and implementation of sector-by-sector legislation for data protec-
tion" [Flaherty, p. 365].
Flaherty also provides guidelines for the responsibilities that such
a commission should have.
"1. Articulating privacy concerns in every relevant situation,
functioning essentially as an alarm system for the protection of
personal privacy.
2. Carrying out oversight to protect the privacy interests of
individuals in all federal information-handling activities.
3. Implementing statutory duties under a revised Privacy Act.
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4. Conducting investigations and audits of information systems
to monitor compliance \'lith the provisions of a revised Privacy
Act.
5. Developing and monitoring the implementation of appropriate
security guidelines and practices for the protection of personal
information in federal hands.
6. Advising and developing regulations appropriate for specific
types of personal information systems. Staff members of the
proposed privacy protection commission could thus become special-
ists in different types of information systems and information
flows.
7. Honitoring and evaluating developments in information tech-
nology Hith respect to their implications for personal privacy.
8. Conducting research and reporting on all types of privacy
issues in the United States" [Flaherty, pp. 365-366:1.
"Some have argued that such a federal privacy protection commission
lacks a constituency, such as a consumer movement, to support it. One
response is that it has been the legislatures in other countries, such as
France and \\fest Germany, that have recognized the need for strong, inde-
pendent data protection agencies; there has never been a mass popular
uprising in favor of such innovative legislation. In the right political
climate, a single congressional subcommittee should be able to persuade
senators and representatives of the need to act, as has happened so often
l ..ith sectoral privacy legislation" [Flaherty, p. 367].
One should not put too much faith in the goverrunent to act, t:hough.
"In evaluating the need for a protective agency, it cannot be emphasized
too strongly that the incentives for the goverrunent and the bureaucracy
are in the direction of invading, or at least ignoring or neglecting,
privacy interests rather than protecting them" [Flaherty, p. 382].
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"A somewhat different, and in may ways more drastic, legislative
approach involves requiring computer manufacturers. users, and data net-
l.;arks to employ prescribed safeguards for maintaining the integrity of
personal information. This can take the form of imposing a statutory dut.y
of care on everyone connected with the data-handling process, which would
have the effect of encouraging privacy consciousness. or of enacting
detailed privacy-oriented technical and procedural requirements that
Hould have to be followed by computer manufacturers and handlers of per-
sonal information" [Hiller, p. 223].
Along this line Hiller has written. "The managers of a computer
system and anyone elsa I.ho is responsible for a release of private infor-
mation should be held liable for the privacy invasion, even if the actual
dissemination to the public is the work of the press and is protected by
the First Amendment" [Miller, p. 199].
John Shattuck has proposed the following "general framework for safe-
guarding individual rights" from privacy invasions by government computer
matching programs.
"1. The Privacy Act should be amended to clarify that computer
matches are not ipso facto 'routine uses' of personal record
systems.
2. No further federal computer matches should be permitted
without express congressional authorization.
3. Congress should not authorize computer matches of sensitive
personal records systems (the confidentiality of which is other-
wise protected by statute) such as taxpayer records maintained
by the IRS, census records maintained by the Census Bureau, or
bank records maintained by federally insured banking institutions.
4. No computer match should be authorized unless and until an
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analysis has been made of its projected costs and projected
savings in the recoupment of funds Ol.j'ed to t.he goverrunent.
The mat.eil should not be authorized unless the public benefit. lol'ill
far outweigh the cost--and unless individual rights will be pro-
tected. The results and full costs of any match should be pUb-
lished.
5. Procedural due process protections for the persons whose
records are to be matched should be specified by statute, inclu-
ding the right to counsel, the right to a full hearing, and the
right to confidentiality of the results of a match"
[Shattuck, p. 541].
Richard KUSSerOl-l has raised obj ections to these guidelines. In his
words. "requiring congressional authorization for each match and affording
persons Hhose records are being matched rights far in excess of those
available to the actual sUbj ects of a laH enforcement inquiry lwuld not
improve--but end--the use of matching" [KusseroH, p. 545]. Some Hould
offer the coun'ter-argument that ending government computer matching Hould
not necessarily be a bad thing.
Kenneth Laudon also offers some proposals for decreasing the abuse
of information.
1. A privacy protection conunission should be created "to advise
the President and Congress on the privacy merits of new systems
and to oversee existing systems."
2. Criteria for evaluating systems should be developed. Ques-
tions to be asked abou't any system should included:
a. Is the system needed?
b. "Will it work and hOH well?"
c. Hhat alternatives are there to the system?
d. How is the system accountable and how does the public
participate?
Also, "congressional conunittees on privacy" should be established.
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3. "Amend the 'routine use' clause of t.he Privacy Act.."
4. "Examine the issue of consent."
5. "Attach a cost to information," as an aid in determining
compensation for damages.
6. "A Constitutional amendment to protect electronic commu-
nication" should be created and enacted.
7. "A Constitutional amendment to protect certain files" should
be created and enacted.
8. "A National Defense Information Systems Education and
Research Act" should be created and enacted [Laudon, pp. 382-lJOO].
Although these proposals are directed toward government systems, such
legislation could be made to encompass private information systems as well.
\\filat can be done to control the rampant abuse of information systems
in the private sector? Susan Gray offers five potent.ial methods of solving
t.his problem. These !.j'ere generated from t.heories formulated by other
authors. Basically, the proposed solutions are: (1) "it is the respon-
sibility of the individual to be well-informed about security systemsi"
(2) some form of liability should be created for maintainers of inaccu-
rate information; (3) limits should be set on "\.j'hat. personal information
may be collected" and enforced by "an oversight organizationj" (4) a
nat.ional computerized fingerprint system should be used to diminish con-
fusion when records of tl.j'O people with similar backgrounds and identifiers
(name, Social Security numbers, et cetera) are encounteredj and (5)
"stricter data-dissemination restrictions" should be created and enforced
so that access to information is more tightly controlled [Gray, pp. 254-255].
David Linowes, whose work is frequently referenced in this paper,
offers nine recommendations for creating a corporat.e privacy behavior
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standard that encompass all conceivable aspects of privacy, including
several not discussed in this paper. They are valid even Hhen examining
government systems, and they make a fine closing piece for a discussion
of potential solutions. These recommendations are:
"1. Acquire only relevant information.
2. Consider pretext interviews unacceptable methods of gather-
ing information.
3. Use no polygraph or other lie detector tests in employment.
4. Allow and encourage employees and consumers to see and copy
records pertaining to them.
S. Keep no secret records.
6. Establish a procedure for challenging and correcting erro-
neous reports.
7. Use information only for the purpose for which it was
originally acquired.
8. Transfer no information without the subjects' authorization
or knowledge.
9. Destroy data after its purpose has been served"
(Linowes, pp. 175-176:1.
If most companies used standards based on these guidelines, a large per-
centage of corporate privacy problems would be eliminated, since so many
stem from employers' OIffi abuse of information. Likewise, the primary
abuser of government systems is the government itself, so legislators may
do well to enact laws that also are based on these guidelines.
Conclusion
"Computerization facilitates bureaucratic trends without originating
(31)
or altering them" [Gray J p. 2li8:1. In other lwrds J there is nothing nel.
under the sun when it comes to the lack of personal privacy. The only
changes over time are in the volume of data known and the speed with
which it can be used to the advantage of the few and the disadvantage of
the many.
Clearly, there is a need for measures to be tak.en to ensure greater
information privacy. Unfortunately, the government cannot be relied upon
to act. Considering the legislat.ors, agencies, and corporations that
support these information systems, it is doubtful that any existing org-
anization l~ill move for greater privacy protection. Until 'the American
people become aware of this problem and act, the trend at...ay from privacy
Hill no doubt continue. By that point, however, it will probably be too
late to stop privacy violators Hith any degree of effectiveness.
(32)
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